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The Commissioners Perspective: The Lived Realities of Commissioning Children’s Preventative 
Services in England and the Role of Discretion  
Alison Body, Centre for Philanthropy, University of Kent 
Abstract 
Commissioning remains the dominant process by which England’s state and third sector financial 
relationships are managed, attracting much criticism and debate. In response, the Civil Society 
Strategy (2018) has called for a renewed focus on collaborative commissioning arrangements. 
However, the absence of much comment on Commissioners suggests we have not paid enough 
attention to the role of the individuals who manage these processes. Semi-structured interviews 
with fifteen Commissioners, responsible for children’s preventative services provides new empirical 
evidence. Drawing on the notion of vertical discretion, that is an individual’s freedom from external 
control, versus horizontal discretion, that is an individuals’ freedom for decision-making this paper 
presents evidence on how Commissioners influence, and in some cases even circumvent, the 
commissioning process. Findings highlight that greater consideration of the role discretion in 
commissioning processes can add some insight into how more collaborative commissioning 
arrangements may be achieved at a local level. 
Introduction 
Commissioning is a process that public sector organisations, such as local government, the national 
health service and police, use to plan, procure, deliver and evaluate services for local communities. It 
marks a step change in state-sector relationships, moving from grant-giving financial arrangement to 
the awarding of contracts through competitive, market-driven processes. As a result, public sector 
bodies increasingly commission other organisations, such as third sector organisations (TSOs) to 
deliver services on their behalf rather than delivering services in-house. In this context, 
Commissioners are the individual state actors tasked with executing and managing the 
commissioning process.  
Ongoing discussion regarding the opportunities and barriers produced through this process, and the 
impact this has on TSOs, are well developed within the academic literature (for example see 
Cunningham, 2008; Crouch, 2014;  NCVO, 2014; Rees et al., 2014; Rees and Mullins., 2016; Salamon 
& Toepler). However, the absence of much comment on, or research into Commissioners suggests 
we have not paid sufficient attention to the impact these individuals can have on the commissioning 
process. Defining discretion ‘the freedom to decide what should be done in a particular situation’ 
(Thormann et al., 2018: 583), this paper questions the extent to which the individual Commissioner 
can influence, shape, manage, and in some cases even circumvent the commissioning process. In 
doing so it examines Commissioners levels of autonomy, resources and freedom to act upon their 
own discretion within the complex political climate in England, which prioritises the outsourcing of 
public services (Glasby, 2011). 
The first section of this paper presents a brief overview of the current literature, first discussing 
commissioning in England, second considering the role and space for discretion within public policy 
and third, discussing children's preventative services as the specific context in which this research is 
conducted. The second section outlines the qualitative methodology and data collection used for 
this research. The third section highlights the specific findings from this research and discusses this 
in the context of discretion making within commissioning.  
 
The Rise of Commissioning and the Commissioner 
Defined as ‘a cycle of assessing the needs of people in an area, designing and then securing an 
appropriate service’ (Cabinet Office, 2006), commissioning is the process by which the formal 
financial and service relationships between the third sector and the state are managed (Rees & 
Mullins, 2016; Milbourne & Murray, 2017). Rooted in the discourse of New Public Management 
(NPM) (Hood, 2011), commissioning promotes a distinct approach to public services which seeks to 
make them more business-like based on private sector models. Emerging prominently in the UK 
since the early 1980s (van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002), development of the dialogue around the purchaser-
provider split, market testing and the mixed welfare economy was accompanied with the launch of 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering (Bovaird et al, 2012). Since 2008, public budget attrition and the 
intensification of organising ideas derived from NPM broadly stressing competition, choice and the 
introduction of business-like techniques, have all had to be taken as givens in the new landscape 
(Hood, 2011).  Emphasis is placed on efficiency and a customer service approach, with services 
delivered within a framework of performance management targets. Indeed the widely accepted idea 
of the commissioning ‘cycle’ which adopts an ‘analysis, planning,  delivery/procurement,  monitoring 
and review’ approach has been broadly adopted across all levels of government (Bovaird et al., 
2012).  
There have been multiple rationales presented for commissioning from a focus on increasing choice, 
devolving decision making to local areas, increasing public services efficiency whilst making them 
more accountable, transparent and opening services to a wider set of providers (HM Government, 
2011). Further rationales have included increasing value for money, encouraging increased joint 
working and information sharing, as well as creating shared and pooled budgets (Rees at al, 2017). 
The arrival of the Coalition government in 2010, intensified a commitment to use commissioning as a 
mechanism to reform and reshape the landscape of public services (Rees, 2014), and subsequently 
drove forwards a ‘commissioning agenda’ principally, as outlined in the Open Public Services White 
Paper, a heightened commitment to outsourcing public sector services and a commitment to the 
concept of ‘payment by results' (HM Government, 2011).   
Certainly, within children’s services Payment by Results (PbR) (or Outcome Based Commissioning) is 
increasingly seen as one mechanism to improve the impact of services available to children and 
families (for example in Children’s Centres and the ‘troubled families’ agenda) (Children’s Society, 
2012; DCLG, 2014). Under such arrangements service providers receive some payment dependent 
upon the achievement of specific outcomes. Developed centrally under the New Labour government 
(1997-2010), the Conservative-coalition government (2010-2015) and the current Conservative 
government (2015-present) have propelled this idea forward (NCVO, 2014). However, this has not 
been without criticism with multiple studies highlighting that PbR risks the temptation for service 
providers to invest their skilled professional time and resources, not on who most need the support 
but on those most likely to ensure that the service provider gets the results that trigger the 
payments (Thoburn, 2013). Further criticisms of PbR contracts have included irrelevant and/or 
detrimental targets; over-simplification of complex services; excessive use pushing financial risk onto 
organisations meaning smaller organisations are unable to participate; and excessive use of targets 
which can minimise innovation and flexibility in service provision (NCVO, 2014). 
In short, the landscape of commissioning remains contested, and has been summarised by various 
actors in different ways (Body & Kendall, 2019; Bovaird et al, 2012; Rees et al, 2017). As a result, 
considerable variation in how this process has been adopted remains, leading to confusion in both 
theory and practice (Macmillan, 2013; Miller & Rees, 2014; Rees et al., 2017), alongside differential 
emphasis applied to the different parts of the commissioning cycle (Rees, 2014). Whilst the term 
commissioning has been adopted widely in discourse, establishing a single definition remains 
problematic. Indeed, Checkland et al., (2012) comment ‘commissioners and providers struggled with 
the more fundamental ideas underpinning commissioning, suggesting that shared understanding is 
far from the norm’ (p.540). More recently, the Civil Society Strategy (HM Government, 2018) makes 
a commitment to collaborative commissioning arrangements, alongside encouraging local 
authorities to maximise social value within their commissioning processes. The potential for more 
collaborative commissioning arrangements has been largely welcomed, however in reality without 
committed funding or clear accountability the strategy remains more of an idea than a reality 
(Bennett et al., 2019).   
Nonetheless, whilst commissioning remains a debated, multifaceted term, the term Commissioner 
has received less attention. Often referred to generically throughout the literature, largely as a 
catch-all term for either individuals, local consortiums, organisations or collectives of organisations, 
and in general reference to those who manage the commissioning cycle, procure and ultimately 
commission a service or services, the role and remit of the Commissioner remains ambiguous. 
According to Miller and Rees (2014) ‘policy portrays Commissioners as the strategic overseers of a 
mixed economy of welfare, using their purchasing and influencing power to ensure that the publicly 
funded system is shaped to achieve the required outcomes within the resources available’ (p.145). 
Nonetheless, as the ‘lynchpin of the commissioning approach’ (Rees et al, 2017), there is limited 
research into the role of Commissioners, particularly as the individuals who are responsible for these 
processes and are tasked with the coordination and management of the commissioning process. 
Often discussed in the literature in homogenous terms, the Commissioner becomes an apparent 
singular form, at time appearing to lack individual agency, voice and power, whilst working in multi-
dimensional situations governed by market forces, and commonly responding to significant social 
need, as in the example of children’s preventative services. Increasingly commentators on these 
relationships are recognising the need for a more nuanced understanding of state and third sector 
relationships. Glasby (2012: 8) suggests commissioning should be viewed not as a stand-alone policy 
but rather as a response to a broader set of changes in the way public services are developed, 
managed and delivered, shifting public services from the ‘traditional’ public administration to the 
adoption of more market orientated concepts and approaches. The Commissioner is then 
responsible for these changes, including setting and measuring clear objectives and outcomes, using 
market mechanisms to drive down costs and improve quality (Shaw & Canavan, 2016). 
Some literature acknowledges the significance of the role of the individual Commissioner and the 
tensions faced. A study into Commissioners experiences in the English National Health Service 
highlighted the need for local, mature, trusting relationships between Commissioners and providers 
in order to provide meaningful partnerships (The Kings Fund, 2018). Meanwhile Egdell and Dutton 
(2016) highlight relational barriers between Commissioners and providers in service specification 
design, and concerns regarding Commissioners understanding of community-level needs. Whilst 
Sellick (2006) discusses the tensions faced by Commissioners within looked after children’s services, 
identifying that despite financial pressures, Commissioners manage dual roles ‘as procurers of costly 
external placements and as professional social workers wishing to promote good child outcomes’ 
(p.462). In later work, Sellick (2011) identifies that further tensions emerge through procurement 
rules creating barriers in communication between commissioners and providers, however suggests 
that ‘legal or not, it seems that ways are being found to avoid the worst constraints of procurement 
rule’ (p.1801). Indeed, Milbourne (2013) highlights that ‘the codification of services into contracts 
potentially removes both Commissioners and providers from the need for effective communication 
about services so that the fairness of, or rationale for, specific performance indicators is concealed’ 
(p.502). Alternatively, Rees (2013) suggests that commissioning can enable more long-term trusting 
relationships to develop, particularly at a local level between Commissioners and providers. In later 
work, Rees et al (2017) further highlight the competing priorities Commissioners must balance 
between representing a purchasing function, which is ‘robust and above suspicion’, versus a 
‘relational mindset that includes fostering and maintaining personal relationships’ (p.191). Their 
research, based upon the commissioning of TSOs in the field of community mental health services, 
highlights the importance of the Commissioner in the commissioning approach and calls for ‘further 
grounded research into the realities of commissioning at the local level’ (Rees et al, 2017:191) 
The Role of Discretion in Public Policy    
The theoretical concept of discretion within public policy making is well developed in the literature 
(for example see Checkland et al, 2018; Lipsky, 2010; Thormann et al., 2018; Verhoest et al., 2004). 
The concept has come to be considered as the space for action that managers have in a given 
situation (Hambrick & Abrahamson, 1995; Finkelstein & Peteraf, 2007; Hupe, 2013). Whilst there is a 
general acceptance in this literature that public policy professionals, such as Commissioners, have an 
important role to play and some level of discretion is inevitable (Checkland et al., 2018; Thormann et 
al., 2018), the practice and benefits of implementation of discretion is more debated.  
To date, actors’ ability to use discretion in the public sector, particularly in relation to children’s 
services, has primarily been discussed in relation to Lipsky’s (2010; 1980) prominent work on street-
level bureaucrats, focusing on frontline workers in children’s services. For example, Wastell et al’s 
(2010) ethnographic study into social workers, found that social workers commonly exercised 
discretion in their work to ensure they carried it out in ways which felt appropriate. Maynard-
Mooney and Musheno (2000), reconstituted Lipsky’s view of street-level bureaucrats as ‘state 
agents’ and instead present the term ‘citizen agent’ (further developed by Durose, 2009: 2011), 
which resonates more with ideas of exercising strong discretion. A distinction here is drawn between 
these agents being ‘rule saturated’ and ‘rule bound’ – and acting as a professional, they draw on 
local knowledge and resources to use their discretion to pragmatically respond to client need 
(Durose, 2009; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000). Durose (2011), takes this concept further, 
describing UK local government workers as ‘civic entrepreneurs’ (see Leadbeater and Goss, 1998), a 
concept she argues is more expansive than Lipsky’s notion of discretion, and is ‘characterised by 
‘discretion’ as a choice or judgement within bureaucratic constraints’ (p.991), creating new, 
emergent spaces on the edge of local governance where traditional organisational structures are 
breaking down.  
Thus far scholars have placed some emphasis on the distinction between alternative forces which 
can help inhibit or create this space for discretion. Top down theories argue that discretion is 
problematic as it stops policy being implemented as required, creating a control problem (Howlett, 
2004). Considered as ‘discretion as granted’ by Howlett (2004) the emphasis is placed upon the 
degree of freedom to make decisions granted by the rule maker, in other words ‘freedom from 
external controls’ (Verhoest et al., 2004; Checkland et al., 2018). We conceptualise this as vertical 
discretion, that is the degree to which actors have freedom from hierarchical external controls from 
more central bodies. In terms of commissioning, for example, this may be interpreted as a 
commitment to payment by results and/or national policies, depletion of resources, etc - where 
‘hard’ targets and rules are imposed on Commissioners, and therefore passed onto TSOs, by external 
controls. In short, in this we consider this as how ‘rule-bound’ or constrained Commissioners as 
public policy actors are. 
Alternatively, bottom-up approaches assume to a certain degree the existence of discretion and 
instead emphasise how the degree of freedom is used in practice. Considered as ‘discretion as used’, 
by Hupe (2013), these bottom up theories argue discretion is a positive part of the policy 
implementation process, allowing policies to be tailored to specific circumstances as required, for 
example in Lipsky’s work on street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky, 1980, 2010; Hill and Hupe, 2009; 
Thormann, 2016). We conceptualise this as a form of horizontal discretion, that is the degree within 
which an individual can manoeuvre within their own individual positioning. Evan and Harris (2004) 
develop a similar concept, identifying a distinction between strong and weak discretion. Strong 
discretion is often associated with professional groups, who are trusted to use their competence and 
expertise, to make decisions in complex and unpredictable situations. Whereas weak discretion, 
means the application of standards or rules, and decision-making within set boundaries of 
established rules. notions of horizontal aspects of discretion, characterised by ‘choice or judgement’ 
(Durose, 2011) where individuals may to more of less degrees, based upon their individual situations 
and internal organisational drivers, draw upon their own professional judgements, resources and 
social skill (Durose, 2009; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2000) in any given situation. 
Thus, the space for discretion depends upon this intersection between the vertical discretion 
granted by the system within which the Commissioner is operating in, that is how rule-bound the 
system may be, and the horizontal discretion characterised by the space for individual choice and 
judgement, driven by individual situations and organisational drivers. It is within this framework, of 
examining the space for discretion from horizontal and vertical perspectives that this paper will now 
focus on, exploring the lived realities of Commissioners commissioning children’s services in England.  
Research Context 
In England, Children’s services are under huge economic strain. Since 2008 austerity and the 
economic crisis has resulted in a ‘doing more for less’ culture (Hulme et al, 2015; Vibert 2016). A 
report by Action for Children (2017), in partnership with The Children’s Society and the National 
Children’s Bureau highlighted a £4billion reduction in funding available across central and local 
government, predicting a 72% reduction in early intervention funding nationally by 2020 based on 
current trends. Simultaneously children social care demand is rising; between 2008 and 2015 local 
authorities in England experienced a 22% increase in referrals, alongside a 16% increase in the 
numbers of children in care (Vibert, 2016). Research reports widespread reductions in both the level 
and quality of services for disabled children, as services shift from preventative support to crisis 
management (Stalker et al, 2015). Whilst the greatest reform of school funding for the last 25 years 
(Institute for Fiscal Studies, 2017), has resulted in further marketization of education (Ball et al, 
2012) and growing concerns about increasing inequalities (Body et al., 2017). 
Heralded as a way to improve outcomes for vulnerable children, commissioning has a prominent 
role in service provision for children and young people. Prioritised in the Labour government, the 
Every Child Matter’s Green Paper (HM Government, 2003) identified commissioning as a way of 
‘developing an overall picture of children’s needs within an area and developing provision through 
public, private, voluntary and community providers to respond to those needs’. By 2006, the Labour 
government had introduced the idea of ‘independent social work practices’, ‘autonomous 
organisations, which could be voluntary or privately owned, responsible for employing social 
workers’ (Vibert, 2016:12), with pilots emerging in 2009/10. In 2016, the DFEs paper, ‘Putting 
Children First’, stated a firm government ambition that over a third of local authorities should be 
delivering ‘alternative models of delivery’ for children’s social care, leading to the expectation that 
further services will be taken out of local authority control (Vibert, 2016).  
Research has highlighted how in practice some TSOs working within children’s services employ a 
range of tactics to negotiate or bypass commissioning processes altogether, through focusing on 
relational models of commissioning (Body & Kendall, 2019). Indeed, a variety of policy based, 
practitioner focused and think-tank based literature has embraced this more relational, collaborative 
approach to commissioning children’s services and has sought to explore how commissioning may 
be most effective in terms of reaching positive outcomes for children, commonly placing the role of 
Commissioner as central to this process (for example see, Aked & Steed, 2009; Asmussem et al, 
2017; Shaw & Canavan, 2016; Vibert, 2016). Consistently this grey-literature highlights the need for 
Commissioners to invest in strong commissioner-provider relationships, use data effectively to make 
evidence-based decisions, achieve value for money, collaborate with the sector and focus on clear 
defined outcomes. Whilst literature finds that most commissioning models seek to incorporate the 
principle of partnership between the Commissioner and beneficiary organisation (Shaw & Canavan, 
2016), in a climate where state and third sector relationships are primarily focused on money and 
efficiency, the purchaser-provider relationship is often challenging (McNeish et al., 2012). 
 
Methodology 
In-depth qualitative, semi-structured interviews were conducted with 15 individuals responsible for 
commissioning children’s preventative services in a single local authority area in England. Each 
interview lasted between one to two hours. Semi-structured questioning explored the 
Commissioners perceptions and views of the commissioning process. Within the research process, 
the Commissioners collectively drew upon 83 examples of commissioning cycles to procure a distinct 
service, or set of services, that they had been involved with. Commissioners then provided 
supplementary information including case studies of commissioning processes, tendering 
documents, minutes of meetings, evaluations, business plans and reports. Adopting an interpretive 
approach, all interviews were recorded and transcribed, read and re-read to decipher an initial list of 
themes. The data was then coded, allowing for both exploration of the themes explored in the 
interviews and any new, emerging themes. Ongoing conversations with the Commissioners, as the 
research developed, allowed an iterative research process to develop, wherein the researcher and 
Commissioners could have ongoing discussion and reflections on the themes emerging in the 
findings. This iterative approach, allowing the researcher to move back and forth between stages, 
revisiting certain aspects at particular points as part of a ‘data analysis spiral’ (Creswell, 1998; Dey, 
1993) ensured a reflective research approach which sought to authentically capture the reflections 
and perceptions of the Commissioners. 
The research underwent university research ethical clearance, and all participants were approached 
prior to interviews and provided with full details of the research aim, process and intended outputs. 
Commissioners were identified for interview through job titles within a single Local Authority area 
within the South East of England. The sample was then further expanded through ‘snowballing’, in 
which Commissioners suggested additional participants. Throughout the research period, three 
‘meet the market’ events were hosted. Attendance at these events, designed for Commissioners and 
providers to meet to discuss key priorities around children’s preventative services, gave the 
researcher further insight into the Commissioner-provider relationships and additional opportunity 
to engage Commissioners in the research process. As the research covered a small geographical 
area, as well as a niche policy area all interview quotations are fully anonymised and only attributed 
as ‘Commissioner’.  
 
Findings  
In the following sections, we explore the Commissioner interviewees’ perceptions of their autonomy 
and scope for discretion within the commissioning processes in the single policy area of children’s 
preventative services. We start by exploring six factors, identified by Commissioners, which they 
perceive negatively impact on their ‘space’ for discretion. We consider these broadly in two groups. 
The first three factors predominantly impact on Commissioners vertical discretion, that is their 
freedom from external controls, whereas the last three factors impact on Commissioners horizontal 
discretion, that is their freedom to make decisions. In the final section of these findings we identify 
different strategies which some Commissioners deploy to manage the gap between demands and 
what they ‘feel should be done’. We discuss the implications of the combination of inhibitors and 
strategies in the discussion section.  
Factors Reducing ‘Space’ for Discretion  
We start by identifying three dominant factors which impact on Commissioners vertical discretion, 
that is their freedom from external controls – these are considered aspects Commissioners felt they 
had little control over:  
1. Process vs Relational Commissioning: Across the Commissioners it was recognised that 
commissioning processes vary widely across public sector bodies, with a recognition of a continuum 
of commissioning approaches between process and relational driven (Body & Kendall, 2019; Rees, 
2014). Relational approaches tended to seek a more collaborative, partnership approach between 
state and TSO actors, whereas process driven tend to be more hierarchical and bureaucratically 
driven by the State actor (see Bovaird and Loeffler, 2012; Crouch, 2011; Cunningham, 2008). Where 
public sector bodies adopt a more relational-driven approach Commissioners are afforded more 
discretion, with commissioning processes typically defined by co-production and partnership 
(Crouch, 2011). In contrast, where public sector bodies adopt a more process-driven commissioning 
approach Commissioners experience less space to exercise individual discretion, or indeed engage in 
more collaborative forms of commissioning, focusing more on the bureaucratic, administrative 
elements of the commissioning cycle, for example as one Commissioner expressed: 
I think we were afraid to talk to providers, we followed the letter of the law and the process. 
We were kept a very close eye on by procurement, they monitored everything, it was all by 
the book…. You don’t get sued that way (Commissioner) 
  
2. Prescriptive Targets: The type of contracts which individual Commissioners oversaw somewhat 
impacted the space for individual discretion within the process. For example, two of the 
Commissioners interviewed, as part of their portfolio were responsible for elements of the troubled 
families programme. Within these circumstances the Commissioners felt they had ‘very little room 
for manoeuvre’ in the ‘highly prescriptive programme’ (Commissioner). Thus, we see here a tension 
between the vertical and horizontal autonomy. Where Commissioners experienced these hard-
external controls, particularly accompanied by reduced freedom for individual choice or judgement, 
the commissioning process was considered bureaucratic and procedural, with little space for 
innovation or flexibility. For example: 
They (TSOs) are now just seen as an extension of public sector workforce, I do as I’m told, 
they must do as they are told, they (Senior Managers in the Public Sector) don’t want ideas 
on what to do better, they just want us to do what it says in the contract. It’s simple, tick the 
right boxes and we get paid more money – it’s not about the children’s wellbeing anymore 
(Commissioner)  
3. Resources: As previously discussed, austerity and reduced public spending has left virtually no 
area of children’s services unscathed. Perhaps unsurprisingly Commissioners commented extensively 
on shifting government priorities which they felt resulted in reductions in resources, such as funding 
available for early intervention support, and increased expectations on them to manage multiple 
services simultaneously. For example, as one Commissioner expressed: 
We are continuously expected to do more with less, be agile and responsive and predict 
where we need to focus next, but with less and less money to distribute, and less people to 
manage it. 
Alongside diminishing resources to distribute, Commissioners themselves felt under increasing 
pressure to oversee an increased number of commissioning processes and contracts. For example, 
one Commissioner highlighted how in 2009/10 they were responsible for 2 major commissioned 
services, both in connected services, and developed close working relationships with the providers, 
by 2013 they had become responsible for 28 commissioned services across a broad spectrum of 
provision. However, whilst all Commissioners experienced these resource pressures, some appeared 
more affected than others.  
The final three dominant factors interviewees perceived impacted on Commissioners horizontal 
discretion, that is their freedom to make decisions. This horizontal space for discretion relied more 
upon individuals positioning, experience and professional background, and thus offered more 
flexibility as Commissioners acted on their choices and judgement: 
4. Seniority of the Commissioner: Within children’s services Commissioners occupied multiple 
different positions and levels of seniority. Commissioners seniority in the organisational structure 
varied both between organisations and within single organisations, such as the local authority. With 
greater seniority, there appeared to be greater levels of autonomy and freedom for discretion. 
Where Commissioners held lower level positions, they often sat with a Commissioning structure or 
team within a larger organisation. Commissioners in lower level positions discussed the need to have 
decisions ratified and ‘signed off’, whereas those in more senior posts felt more empowered to ‘be 
the decision maker’.  
5. Single versus Multi-disciplinary Teams: Commissioners occupied different roles, some were based 
in a single team located within a specific organisation, for example the local authority, whilst others 
worked and reported to a multi-disciplinary team, working across a number of commissioning 
organisations. In the first case of the single teams, Commissioners tended to adopt roles more akin 
with a coordinator and generalist role, as part of a team they were responsible for a wide portfolio 
of children’s services. Here, discretion was perceived to be distributed more widely across the team 
and more formulaic, and process-driven commissioning approaches dominated. For example, they 
rarely saw themselves as the decision maker, as one Commissioner comments:  
There is a real difference between what I feel should happen and what does happen, we have 
a process to follow and the process doesn’t always lead to the most expected outcome, but 
that’s what commissioning is supposed to be about. 
In contrast, individuals who worked across multi-disciplinary teams, often leading on a specific joint 
commissioning venture, held far greater degrees of autonomy, and were trusted as a ‘lead 
professional’ to advise and direct the commissioning process. One Commissioner commented:  
I’m left to it, I advise the board of what I think it is best to do and they go with that, so I end 
up commissioning the people I like, the organisations I know can deliver based on what I 
know is needed. 
6. Professional Background: Professional background matters. Of the fifteen interviewees, twelve 
were qualified professionals within children’s services, for example three social workers, two 
teachers, two early years practitioners, two youth workers and three mental health professionals. 
The remaining three individuals had policy and procurement-based backgrounds. There was 
consistency amongst the interviewees, particularly those with professional backgrounds within the 
children’s workforce, that commissioning, as a process, had the ability to improve children’s services 
for the better. This acted as a strong motivator for the Commissioners decision making, for example: 
After qualifying as a teacher, I worked in education for 8 years. After that I went and worked 
in a charity providing early intervention services for children. We specialised in anti-bullying 
and peer mentoring support. I loved my job, but I often felt frustrated that it always seemed 
the money went to the wrong places. When a job came up in the Local Authority’s 
commissioning team, I went for it. I felt I’d be able to achieve and influence real change and I 
think I have. It is a job which has a lot of influence but also a lot of responsibility – and I feel 
that every day – a moral duty to do the right thing. (Commissioner) 
However, those with a children’s workforce background, compared to those who had a policy 
making/ procurement background, consistently expressed a prioritisation to ‘get it right’ for 
children, above following the process. These Commissioners were most likely to employ the 
strategies we outline below in order to bypass what they perceived as ‘unhelpful’ processes. 
Whilst the above factors identified by interviewees potentially create or inhibit space for ‘discretion 
as granted’ (Howlett; 2004) and ‘discretion as used (Hupe, 2013), they cannot be considered to 
determine how Commissioners exercise discretion within their role. Instead these factors appear to 
help define the Commissioners starting point, in other words, the space available in terms of 
exercising their discretion. It is within the framework of these horizontal and vertical aspects of 
discretion that we can then understand common routines and strategies that Commissioners 
develop to shape, and even in some cases bypass, the established procedures. 
 
Strategies Employed to Bypass Bureaucratic Systems 
Here we consider the strategies employed by Commissioners in the commissioning process to 
bypass what they perceived as overly bureaucratic systems. These can be broadly defined under 
three headings; back-stage engagement, promoting visibility and buffering. 
Strategy one: Back-stage engagement  
Commissioners suggested a high degree of informal engagement with certain TSOs in the structuring 
and commissioning of services. This was alongside stressing a consistent desire to ‘get it right’ 
(Commissioner) for children and the importance of the relationships with TSOs in achieving this:  
Engaging providers is absolutely central to what we do, we have to work in partnership, our 
role is to coordinate the whole process, not be the dictator of it (Commissioner) 
 
Interestingly, whilst Commissioners also emphasised the importance of running fair, open and 
transparent commissioning processes, this was often alongside, and in tension with, highlighting the 
importance of trust, prior knowledge and established working relationships with TSOs. For example, 
as one Commissioner pointed out: 
The processes are really good for making sure it is all fair, but… well I mean, at the end of the 
day it still comes down to people, doesn’t it? And, well, people still comes down to 
relationships, there is no getting away from it, we know who we want to work with and we 
definitely know who we don’t.  
 
Furthermore, the research consistently found that Commissioners favoured certain TSOs over others 
often due to having worked with them before. The prior knowledge led to established trust and 
potentially perceived advantageous circumstances for those TSOs considered as ‘close’ (Macmillan 
et al, 2013). As one Commissioner commented: 
There is a world of difference between running a formal consultation process and picking up 
the phone to someone you know to ask their opinion… and a lot of that goes on… so we do 
consult the sector, but we consult those we know… well those who know what they are 
talking about. (Commissioner)  
 
These back-stage, more informal relationships, were particularly prominent in situations where 
Commissioners appeared to seek to exert high levels of individual discretion, often in protest 
response to more process driven commissioning approaches. Thus, Commissioners actively sought 
mechanisms to bypass what they perceived as overly bureaucratic systems.  
 
Strategy two: Promoting visibility of preferred TSOs  
As public-sector cuts in children’s services escalated and commissioning intensified as a mechanism 
to increase the mixed welfare economy, there was a perception by Commissioners of increased local 
politician’s involvement in the commissioning processes, which Commissioners often found 
problematic. For example, a Commissioner outlined how a significant amount of funding had been 
approved by local politicians as a grant, to a group of organisations bypassing an ongoing 
commissioning process. Others highlighted how they felt, politically, that they could not stop funding 
a particular TSO due to the connections individuals within that TSO had to senior political members. 
Thus, Commissioners frequently faced a dilemma about how to negotiate these relationships within 
a professional process. However, this was not always considered a disadvantage, as more than half 
of the Commissioners highlighted how they would promote TSOs who they felt were particularly 
effective with political members to help secure their relationship with the local authority. For 
example, one Commissioner stated: 
I think a lot of the success of organisations is based on visibility, the more visible the 
better….well for the right reasons of course. Some voluntary organisations are very good at 
self-promoting and having this visibility with members [the local political representatives], 
others not so much. Part of our role then is to promote and make visible those strong 
providers.  
 
Strategy three: Buffering 
Participants within this research suggest they often view their position as ‘a buffer between the local 
authority and the providers’ (Commissioner) and develop a narrative of ‘service protectors’. As one 
Commissioner commented: 
We were not in position to lower the level of cuts – everyone blamed us but it wasn’t our 
decision, I didn’t even agree with it… we couldn’t stop it, but I do feel as Commissioners we 
had an opportunity to soften the blow and we did… yes it was bad but it could have been 
worse.  
The concept of Commissioners as protectors, buffering TSOs from austerity, also featured during the 
tendering and contract management processes. They felt a responsibility to push TSOs for 
monitoring information, ‘which would be the type the local authority wants to see’ (Commissioner), 
once the TSO had secured the tender in order to help secure the services future, especially in 
situations where delivery in PbR contracts were falling short of requirements. Indeed, several 
Commissioners highlighted mechanisms in which they ‘advised’ TSOs to ‘be flexible in their 
interpretation of the rules’ in their presentation of statistical information in order to ‘tick boxes to 
draw down money’ (Commissioner).  
 
Discussion  
The interpretive approach adopted in this research does not attempt to make grand claims of 
generalisability across all commissioning processes and/or all Commissioners. Instead it seeks to 
provide a deep and rich narrative from the Commissioners themselves. The desire to ‘get it right’ 
coupled with ever-growing frustrations of diminishing resources for children’s preventative services, 
appears to have provided the ‘action imperative’ (Hupe & Hill, 2007) which encourages some 
individual Commissioners to exercise their freedom to make decisions, considered here as horizontal 
discretion, despite the system, seeking to maximise their impact in constrained conditions. In short, 
even where Commissioners perceived they had little room to alter ‘external controls’, some 
Commissioners were prepared to bend, or even at times break, the rules to navigate the system 
within their ‘freedom to make decisions’, when they felt the processes were inadequate in 
addressing the needs. These Commissioners were prepared, to greater and lesser extents, to actively 
pursue these horizontal decision-making opportunities in this space. Here we argue that the 
ambiguity of commissioning, or as Rees et al., (2017) suggests the incompleteness of commissioning, 
presents the very opportunity for some Commissioners to exercise a high degree of discretion and 
take all the flexibility the system has to offer.  
Notably, drawing on the data and examples from the interviews undertaken, amongst the 
interviewees involved in this research, three distinct approaches to commissioning emerged. We 
discuss these in terms of the idea of freedom to make decisions (horizontal discretion) and freedom 
from external controls (vertical discretion) (Checkland et al., 2018; Howlett, 2004; Hupe; 2013; 
Verhoest et al., 2014), the higher the levels of discretion, the more freedom the Commissioner has. 
 
i) Low Horizontal Discretion/ Low Vertical Discretion: In this scenario procurement driven, risk 
adverse, non-collaborative approaches to commissioning dominated. In keeping with Milbourne’s 
(2013) findings, such approaches often led to a break down in the communication between 
Commissioner and provider. For example, as one Commissioner, who it could be suggested occupied 
this space, commented on a recent process to commission children’s preventative services: 
 We just didn’t talk to any providers, it wasn’t about lack of respect or lack of want, it was 
about fear. We just didn’t dare, as if we did we were told that we would give unfair 
advantage to certain TSOs and we would be open to challenge. The whole thing was about 
minimising risk.  
Within this type of commissioning approach, there was little evidence of the systematic use of the 
strategies discussed. 
ii) High Horizontal Discretion/ Low Vertical Discretion: In this scenario Commissioners identified 
themselves as expert professionals and relied more extensively on their own discretion, thus they 
sought strategies to overcome what they perceived as bureaucratic and unhelpful processes. In 
short, they self-created space for discretion, despite the system. Therefore a common theme here 
was the exercising of strategies, to bypass or influence the established processes from ‘behind closed 
doors’ (Commissioner). This created somewhat of a counterbalance to the process-driven market-
orientated approach, where TSOs would experience a stronger Commissioner-provider relationship 
within the confines of a bureaucratic commissioning approach. However, within this Commissioners 
felt ‘vulnerable’, ‘exposed’ and ‘concerned about getting into serious trouble’ due to the perceived 
risks they took ‘in bending the rules’ (Commissioner). Such findings chime with Sellick’s (2011) 
identification that Commissioners will often work outside of the rules, ‘legal or not’, to secure 
positive outcomes for children. Whilst the Commissioners acknowledged that they followed the 
process to a certain extent, they used their individual relationships to develop a more relational-
feeling approach to achieve what they felt was right. Thus, Commissioners felt conflicted between 
what they felt was the ‘bureaucratic driver’ of the public sector organisation, and what they ‘felt was 
in the best interest of children’s services’ (Commissioner). For example, as one Commissioner 
expressed in their interview:  
There is what commissioning is supposed to be, the story I am supposed to tell, and what 
commissioning is in reality…. They’re two very different things. 
The employment of the identified strategies, particularly ‘buffering’, were commonplace here, and it 
was by far the most common commissioning process experiences identified by the interviewees. 
However, this commissioning approach left Commissioners frustrated and discontented. They  
discussed feeling that they had to take risks in interpretation of the rules in order to secure the best 
outcomes for children, an outcome they rarely felt they fully achieved, which created tension for 
their relationships both within their professional role and with the communities they sought to 
serve. Furthermore, Commissioners frequently suggested irritation at TSOs who they felt they were 
trying to help but would not 'play the game'. For example, one Commissioner angrily commented: 
Commissioning is a game and we don’t make the rules, that’s way above our heads, but if 
you want to work for and provide services on behalf of the authority you must play that 
game and find ways to get around the issues. Some voluntary sector providers seem to think 
that is our job, to sort it out for them, others recognise they need to meet us half way.  
Here however we witnessed the potential formation of exclusionary clubs, or as Osbourne (1997) 
referred to them, ‘clans’, where emphasis sits with the relational networks and social context of 
TSOs as social actors. A particular risk within this approach is that these clans play out behind closed 
doors, under the guise of a market-orientated approach. As a result, these networks remain 
orientated around particular social networks and there was little evidence of ‘new’ TSOs being able 
to enter the clan, resulting in a potential favouritism of certain providers.  
iii) High Horizontal Discretion/ High Vertical Discretion: Where Commissioners felt their organisation 
internally supported a relational driven approach, they were well positioned in the organisation and 
had strong professional experience in the children’s workforce, coupled with softer external 
controls, they felt they had strong freedom to exercise their own discretion (Durose, 2011), and as a 
result a new space for commissioning appeared to be emerging. For example, in one case a 
Commissioner supported an established TSO to lead a consortium of local providers, informed by 
data analysis and community engagement, to reconfigure the early intervention services in a 
particularly deprived geographical area, based on the consortium's and the Commissioners 
significant local knowledge. Intended outcomes were co-designed with the community and the 
service provision was flexible. Coordinating the services across commissioning bodies, the 
Commissioner, along with the consortium of local providers and community, developed a range of 
widely acknowledged innovative services. It is here within which we can see the potential for 
commissioning to open up a more transparent, democratic commissioning space, which encourages 
greater collaboration between TSOs and the state, and the Commissioner adopt a role more akin to 
the civic entrepreneur (Durose, 2011). 
 
Conclusion 
This research paper responds to the call for ‘further grounded research into the realities of 
commissioning at the local level’ (Rees et al, 2017:191), using children’s services as a case study 
example. As children’s services come under increasing strain, traditional organisational structures 
are breaking down, for example, education, health and early intervention support. Whilst this break 
down of traditional institutions and subsequent blurring of the boundaries creates significant 
problems for vulnerable children, it provides the ‘action imperative’ (Hupe & Hill, 2007) to develop 
innovative commissioning responses which, step outside of the traditional and policy ‘rule bound’ 
boundaries. The reality is that Commissioners are largely critical of overly bureaucratic 
commissioning processes, and often seek to rebalance them through the employment of the 
strategies discussed, often at professional risk to themselves. Predominantly the findings highlighted 
that Commissioners feel motivated to act upon their own discretion. Within commissioning 
processes where vertical discretion was limited by external controls this means Commissioners 
utilise horizontal discretion opportunities to ‘bend the rules’, or ‘play the game’ to ensure that 
contracts are secured at a local level by TSOs that they perceive as best placed to the deliver the 
required services. Thus, process driven commissioning often becomes more relational, but ‘behind 
closed doors’, favouring certain TSOs over others. 
Creating a commissioning space which is not overly bureaucratic or risk adverse, outcome focused 
and seeks to redistribute power across stakeholders, potentially facilitates the Commissioner to both 
draw on their discretion in an open democratic way and openly invite others to join their ‘clan’ 
(Osbourne, 1997). Nonetheless, this paper does not seek to suggest the civic entrepreneur 
Commissioner as the panacea to all criticisms of commissioning, recognising that such approaches 
can still be somewhat exclusive for selected TSOs. However, the realities of commissioning 
highlighted in this paper do suggest that to achieve what they perceive as the best outcomes for 
children, Commissioners will, majority of the time act on their discretion as much as they are able. 
Commissioners remain central to the commissioning process, and are often left to, or tasked with, 
construction and overall facilitation of the commissioning process. This construction is rarely without 
agenda or bias, commonly based on significant skill and experience. To utilise these skills and really 
maximise the potential of collaborative commissioning arrangements as highlighted in the Civil 
Society Strategy (2018), policy makers should seek to create the space for Commissioners to drive 
forward relational commissioning, and trust Commissioners as highly skilled professionals to carry 
out this process in an authentic, transparent and democratic way. Under such approaches, expecting 
compliance with hard external controls is unrealistic – instead they we could suggest they should be 
empowered to perform their roles utilising their professional knowledge, openly exercising their 
discretion to ensure they respond to local needs (Barrett, 2004).  
Whilst these findings do not attempt to suggest generalisability across all Commissioners, they do 
offer some important insight for policy discussions. Nevertheless, this research is not without its 
limitations. Drawing on participants from a single niche policy area, in a single local authority area 
limits the overall application of these findings to all policy and geographical areas. Furthermore, 
children’s services can often be considered as a particularly emotive and value-led policy area, which 
may inspire more confidence in individuals from policy specific professional backgrounds exercising 
their own discretion in decision making processes. Ultimately further work is needed, to examine the 
lived experiences and realities of commissioning from the Commissioners perspectives, how this 
may impact on the sustainability of their roles and their commitment to their field of work, to fully 
understand the complex and nuanced process of commissioning.  
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